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INVESTMENT SECURITIES 
By 
THOMAS H. JOLLS* 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
Fictitious Person as a Registered Holder of Stock 
1057 
Probably the most significant and the most interesting case to be 
reported is Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. ,v. Walston & Co., 21 
N.Y. 2d 219, 234 N.E. 2d 230, 287 N.Y.S. 2d 58~ (1967). The case 
was reargued and affirmed under the same title at 22 N.Y. 2d 672, 
291 N.Y.S. 2d 366 (1968). 
This was not a decision under the Code, as the events took place 
before its effective date in New York. In attempting, however, to come 
to grips with what seems to be a case of first impression, ·both the 
majority and the nlinority in this 4-to-3 decision did not hesitate to 
range over statutory materials characterized by varying types of in-
applicability: Article 8 of the Code (not yet law); Article 3 of the 
Code (pot yet law, and if it were, inapplicable per section 3-103); 
the Negotiable Instruments Law (applicable only to instruments pay-
able in money; restrictive fictitious payee provision therein expanded 
in scope by the Code in section 3-405). 
The only statutes clearly applicable were the New York Personal 
Property Law sections corresponding to the ,Uniform Stock Transfer 
Act, which does not in terms deal with the "fictitious person" prob-
lem-as the court saw it, the heart of the case. 
Brokerage firm A was the holder and owner of stock certificates 
of three companies, duly indorsed in blank by prior owners, which 
it desired to have transferred to its own riame, either for its own account 
or for the account of customers. One of A's clerks, M, whose duty it 
was to prepare transfer instructions and forward certificates to the ap-
propriate transfer agents, inserted in the instructions the name "Jack 
Arbetell" as the transferee, instead of the name of A as he was sup-
posed to do. Apparently this transmittal went forward in the routine 
of the hundreds or thousands of such transactions which a large broker-
age firm would be handling daily; the shares were transferred per in-
structions; when the new certificates came back from the transfer agents, 
the clerk, M, who was apparently in a position to do so, simply took 
possession of the certificates. An accomplice of M then presented him~ 
self to Brokerage firm B seeking to sell the securities; B's employee or 
employees accepted the somewhat scanty identification of "Jack Arbe-
*Member of the Illinois Bar; Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of 
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vestment Securities. This survey was prepared with the assistance of Subcommit-
tee members Richard E. Deer, Richard B. Dewey, John P. Eastham, William W. 
Fisher and Bruce Alan Mann. 
1058- The Business Lawyer 
tell," opened an account, guaranteed the signatures, and paid over the 
proceeds of $76,000. "Arbetell" was a non-existent person, at least 
if one is willing, as the majority of the court was, to take M's word for 
this vital fact. The fraud having been discovered, A's assignee, its in-
surer, now sues B for conversion. 
The majority of the court, centering its attention on §168 of the 
New York Personal Property Law (§7, Uniform Stock Transfer Act), 
under which the true owner can reclaim a stock certificate and rescind 
the transfer unless it has been transferred to a purchaser for value in 
good faith, concluded that Broker B was guilty of conversion as against 
A, and must pay A the value of the stock. The court found that under 
the applicable New York law the test of good faith of the selling broker 
(B) was at least as strict as that expressed in Code section 8-318, 
which provides that in the case of a selling broker good faith includes 
"observance of reasonable commercial standards,"- and it held that 
Rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange "formulates what are 'rea-
sonable commercial standards' in this context by requiring the broker 
to use d~Ie diligence to learn the essential facts relative to its customers." 
However, the final decision in favor-of A must be considered as based 
on §162 of the New York Personal Property Law-i.e., there was no 
proper indorsement of the certificates. 
The dissenting opinion favors B on the ground that the accomplice's 
signature on the certificates constituted the indorsement "by the per-
son appearing by the certificate to be the owner of the shares repre-
sented thereby," which was required by § 162 of the New York Personal 
Property Law ( § 1, Uniform Stock Transfer Act) in order to transfer 
title. Application of the fictitious payee doctrine is the key element in 
this rationale, and its application was apparently thought justified in 
part by the fact that the larceny began when the original certificates 
(bearing proper indorsements in blank by the actual owners thereof, 
and therefore "negotiable") were sent to the transfer agents for reis-
suance in the name of the fictitious person. 
It is difficult to ~ccept the majority's portrayal of A as one who has 
suffered a wrong. One looks in vain for a finding that A had some 
duty to someone in this case. A delegated to its clerks, and placed 
within the scope of their employment, the matter of giving issuance in-
structions to tran~fer agents (an accepted commercial practice). A's 
employee committed fraud on his employer, and on his employer's 
customers (not to say the issuers and transfer agents). B's employee 
was at most negligent. 
Whether or not the "fictitious payee" analogy is accepted, should 
not the case have been decided on the basis of an estoppel against A, 
to reach a just result, contrasting A's employee's fraud with B's em-
ployee's negligence? 
A number of problems may well arise out of this case to which the 
majority opinion will not provi~e satisfactory answers. If this case had 
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come up under the Code, an analysis based on the application of several 
Code provisions would have been in order here, space permitting. 
Perhaps the conclusion should be that an amendment to Article 8 
is needed, to incorporate the substance of section 3-405, to put the risk 
of the "fictitious ownership situation on the presentor for transfer-
not on issuers, signature guarantors, or subsequent intermediaries and 
purchasers. It is at the point of registration of transfer that the damage 
is done, and at that point the means of prevention lies solely with the 
presentor." 
D~livery to a Purchaser 
In The Berkeley, Inc. v. Brettler, 234 N.E. 2d 742 (Mass. Sup. Jud. 
Ct. 1968), the court held valid a gift of corporate stock, where the 
stock certificate belonging to and issued in the name of M was in 
possession of the corporation's attorney, and M signed and delivered 
to him a stock power in blank, intending thereby a gift to her husband, 
A, of the shares represented by the certificate. The inference was that 
the' attorney was acting on behalf of A who was hospitalized. The at-
torney later filled in the stub in the corporation's transfer book to show 
A as having become the shareholder, although a new certificate was not 
in fact issued. 
The court referred to two Massachusetts cases indicating that de-
livery of a stock power alone would not make an effective transfer, 
but pointed out that in the present case there was a settled donative 
intention together with an actual or symbolic delivery of the subject 
matter in such manner as completely to transfer the dominion and 
control of it. Section 8-313 was cited, wherein it states "(1) Delivery 
to a purchaser occurs when (a) he or a person designated by him 
acquires possession of a security." While the Code definition of "de-
livery" as "voluntary transfer of possession" [section 1-201(14)] was 
not mentioned, the holding seems consistent therewith. Reference was 
made to the inclusion of a donee in the definition of "purchaser" in 
section 1-201(32). It was pointed out that to require the attorney to 
hand M's certificate to her, so that she could hand it back to him, would 
have involved a futile and unnecessary act. 
Statute of Frauds 
Cohn, Ivers & Co. v. Gross, 56 Misc. 2d 491, 289 N.Y.S. 2d 301 
(App. Term 1968), involved a "call" on stock. The plaintiff was a "put 
and call" broker who, as found by the court below, orally purchased 
from an individual (the defendant), for a premium, a call on 100 shares 
of X Corporation stock at a specified price. Such a "call" is in the 
nature of an option giving the optionee (plaintiff) the right to claim 
the subject matter upon payment of the agreed price by a specified 
date. 
In finding for the plaintiff, the court held that this oral contract 
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was not governed by section 8-319 relating to the sale of securities, 
because the call was not a "security" as defined in section 8-102. It 
can also be pointed out that securities as so defined are "negotiable in-
struments" (section 8-105) and there is no document of this character 
arising out of the acts of the parties. Rather, we are looking at a simple 
contract falling within the "catch-all" statute of frauds section 1-206, 
as pointed out by the court. This section exempts from the requirement 
of a writing a contract, such as this was, involving not more than $5,000 
(either as to the price paid for the call, or the value of the stock de-
liverable upon exercise). 
Lindsey v. Stein Brothers and Boyce, Inc., 433 S.W. 2d 669 (Tenn. 
Sup. Ct. 1968), raises the question of the applicability of the statute 
of frauds (section 8-319) to a brokerage transaction. The plaintiff 
claimed that in a telephone conversation he directed his broker to sell 
100 shares of X stock at 85; two days later the stock reached that price 
and nothing was done; after plaintiff's further inquiry imd further 
lapse of time, the stock was sold at 64. Upon a suit against the broker 
to recover the difference between $6,400 and $8,500, the lower court 
held that the statute of frauds was a good defense and that the plaintiff's 
bill of complaint was insufficient in law. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, concluded that the re-
lationship between the plaintiff and defendant being one of principal 
and agent rather than buyer and seller, the statute of frauds did not 
apply. The court relied on Stott v. Greegos, 95 N.J. Sup. 96, 230 A.2d 
154 (1967), directly in point and discussed in last year's survey.1 It 
was there suggested that Official Comment 2 to section 8-319 should 
be clarified and, in effect, purged of references to strictly brokerage 
transactions. Such action might avoid the necessity of re-litigating this 
same question in still other jurisdictions. 
Possible Violation of Securities Act of 1933 as a Bar to Tr{lnsfer 
In Shearson, Hammill and Co., Inc. v. Yankee Plastics, Inc., 5 
U.C.C. Rep. 224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968) it was held, con-
sistently with, section 8-401 of the Code, that there was no restrictive 
legend on stock certificates (section 8-204) the issuer was obligated 
to make transfer, and could not advance an unsupported claim that a 
"' "no-action" letter from the SEC should be presented. However, in 
Travis lnv. Co. v. Harwyn Publishing Corp., 288 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1968), where the presenter was a broker seeking transfer into 
his own name for the purpose of sale, the court held that under the 
common law of New York (the Code not yet being effective at the 
time of the transaction) the issuer was justified in withholding transfer 
where the New York Regional Office of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission had served written notice on the transfer agent that "con-
1. JoJis, Investment Securities, 23 Bus. Law. 849 (1968). 
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trol" stock of the issuer was likely to be presented for transfer in con-
nection with sales in violation of the Securities Act of 1933. Quaere, 
under the C0de whether there would be a duty to register transfer (sec-
tion 8-401); whether the Securities and Exchange Commission is an 
"adverse claimant" (section 8-301); whether the issuer's duty of in-
quiry could be discharged by notice to the Commission per section 
8-403 coupled with a failure on its part to take injunctive action; or 
whether such informal notification does not, of itself, place the issuer 
under a duty to inquire and thus negate the statutory obligation to 
register transfer. 

